It started with
rising delinquencies and foreclosures on the American property market in 2007,
when the majority (including top US government and central bank officials)
still believed that it was a crisis of mortgage finance (or a special segment
of it) and that the problems would not spread to the rest of the economy. For
most, a severe crisis was unimaginable in developed countries with
sophisticated financial sectors, especially in the leading economy in the
world. However, by the autumn of 2008 the crisis had brought Wall Street to the
verge of collapse. Unprecedented scenes followed: bankruptcies or bailouts of
the masters of the financial universe, including the two largest financial
corporations of America (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), the largest insurance
company in the world (AIG) and all of the five big Wall Street investment
banks. It soon went global, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers interbank
lending was frozen worldwide, central banks (the lenders of last resort)
remained the lenders of only resort. The United Kingdom witnessed the first run
on a bank in more than a century, mortgage lenders, banks, corporations and
even countries all around the world went bankrupt or were bailed out almost on
a daily basis. By 2009, it was clear that this was the largest global financial
crisis since the Great Depression. How could American borrowers defaulting on
their mortgages (in volumes of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars) trigger
a multitrillion dollar global financial meltdown? How was it possible in the
United States to get a mortgage loan up to 100% of the value of the property
without verified income, job or assets? How could financial innovations praised
for a long time lead to a chain reaction wiping out whole segments of the
financial industry? How could so many financial institutions be so fragile that
a few percentage points loss in their asset portfolio would bring them to the
brink of bankruptcy? How did government action and inaction not only allow this
to happen but contribute to it, turning America to a big financial Las Vegas? A
giant casino, where (unlike in real gambling casinos) the bets are guaranteed
by the government, so almost everybody is gambling because one can never lose,
the gains are privatized, and the losses nationalized. How it was possible to
gamble for so long without serious consequences? In his search for answers to
these questions, Zsolt Gál in his book examines the
causes of the last financial crisis He offers a detailed view on the incentives
of various actors, showing that gambling from Main Street to Wall Street was
rather a rational strategy as the consequence of pervasive systemic
motivations. One should change the system challenging these motivations to
prevent history from repeating itself.Thursday, February 28, 2013
The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis by Zsolt Gál
It started with
rising delinquencies and foreclosures on the American property market in 2007,
when the majority (including top US government and central bank officials)
still believed that it was a crisis of mortgage finance (or a special segment
of it) and that the problems would not spread to the rest of the economy. For
most, a severe crisis was unimaginable in developed countries with
sophisticated financial sectors, especially in the leading economy in the
world. However, by the autumn of 2008 the crisis had brought Wall Street to the
verge of collapse. Unprecedented scenes followed: bankruptcies or bailouts of
the masters of the financial universe, including the two largest financial
corporations of America (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), the largest insurance
company in the world (AIG) and all of the five big Wall Street investment
banks. It soon went global, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers interbank
lending was frozen worldwide, central banks (the lenders of last resort)
remained the lenders of only resort. The United Kingdom witnessed the first run
on a bank in more than a century, mortgage lenders, banks, corporations and
even countries all around the world went bankrupt or were bailed out almost on
a daily basis. By 2009, it was clear that this was the largest global financial
crisis since the Great Depression. How could American borrowers defaulting on
their mortgages (in volumes of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars) trigger
a multitrillion dollar global financial meltdown? How was it possible in the
United States to get a mortgage loan up to 100% of the value of the property
without verified income, job or assets? How could financial innovations praised
for a long time lead to a chain reaction wiping out whole segments of the
financial industry? How could so many financial institutions be so fragile that
a few percentage points loss in their asset portfolio would bring them to the
brink of bankruptcy? How did government action and inaction not only allow this
to happen but contribute to it, turning America to a big financial Las Vegas? A
giant casino, where (unlike in real gambling casinos) the bets are guaranteed
by the government, so almost everybody is gambling because one can never lose,
the gains are privatized, and the losses nationalized. How it was possible to
gamble for so long without serious consequences? In his search for answers to
these questions, Zsolt Gál in his book examines the
causes of the last financial crisis He offers a detailed view on the incentives
of various actors, showing that gambling from Main Street to Wall Street was
rather a rational strategy as the consequence of pervasive systemic
motivations. One should change the system challenging these motivations to
prevent history from repeating itself.
Saturday, April 14, 2012
Politologica Actualis, Ročník I.
Texty pôvodne vyšli v sérii
Pracovné zošity Katedry politológie FiF UK, ktorá prináša priebežné
výsledky výskumu zamestnancov, doktorandov a študentov katedry.
© Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, 2011
K dispozícii tu.
© Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, 2011
K dispozícii tu.
Slovensko ako nový členský štát EÚ: Výzva z periférie?
Kniha Dariny Malovej, Erika Láštica a Mareka Rybářa analyzuje politické inštitúcie a politických aktérov na Slovensku a ich reakcie na meniace sa prostredie po vstupe Slovenska do Európskej únie.
Kniha je k dispozícii tu.
V rukách politických strán: Referendum na Slovensku 1993-2010
Kniha Erika Láštica analyzuje históriu referenda na Slovensku od roku 1993 a spôsob, akým ho využívali politické strany.
Kniha je k dispozícii tu.
"Tento národ si žiada, aby referendum bolo a bude niesť túto ťarchu na svojich bedrách."
J.Ľupták, poslanec a predseda ZRS, 36. schôdza NR SR, august 1994
"Ak by však referendum nebolo úspešné, HZDS nebude cítiť za stratu finančných prostriedkov, ktoré si vyžiada, zodpovednosť. Za referendum zodpovedajú v prvom rade občania, ich problém, keď neprídu. Potom nech si nesťažujú".
O. Keltošová, poslankyňa HZDS o referende, ktoré iniciovalo jej hnutie, jún 2000
“Zmenu jednotlivých ustanovení ústavy priamo rozhodnutím občanov v referende naša ústava neumožňuje a niet pre takéto riešenie ani historického precedensu a ani obdoby v iných demokratických krajinách”.
K. Tóthová, podpredsedníčka vlády SR pre legislatívu, SME, máj 1997
"(A) referendom sa môže meniť aj ústava, vážení. ...Teda je veľkým omylom tvrdiť,..., že referendum nie je zákonodarná moc. To je zákonodarná moc ľudu- najdemokratickejšia.... Ak by sme totiž nepripustili, že referendom môžeme meniť ústavu, vážené národné zhromaždenie, tak sa odchýlime od celoeurópskej zvyklosti.“
K. Tóthová, poslankyňa HZDS, 32. schôdzi NR SR, jún 1994
„Ak pripúšťate, že ústavu možno meniť referendom, tak sa obávam, že sa posúvame na klzkú pôdu. To som ešte nepočul, aby referendom sa mohla meniť ústava. Ako to môže jeden právnik pripustiť? To je skutočne hodné Nobelovej ceny za právo.“
F. Mikloško, poslanec KDH a neskorší propagátor referenda o priamej voľbe prezidenta v priamej reakcii na vystúpenie K. Tóthovej, 32. schôdzi NR SR, jún 1994
From Listening to Action? New Member States in the European Union
A book From Listening to Action? New Member States in the European Union by Darina Malová et.al. is a result of the research project “New member states’ strategies in the EU: striking a new balance between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making?”. The project was conducted from January 2007 to June 2010) and supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No.APVV-0660-06.
Content
Chapter 1: Introduction; Chapter 2:Domestic Politics and National Preferences in the European Union; Chapter 3: A Fairy Tale with Happy Ending? The New Member States and the Eurozone Entry; Chapter 4: Security First: Energy Policy in the New Member States of the European Union; Chapter 5: Foreign and Security Policy Preferences; Chapter 6: Can‘t Have it Both Ways? Administrative Capacity of New Member States in European Affairs; Chapter 7: Conclusion: Political Culture and Style in the New Member States
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